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journals dedicated to philosophy of religion, none from this journaL ... 
The book jacket proclaims that the collection presents II a diverse col-
lection of arguments for the stunning conclusion that God does not 
exist," but what it presents would in no way stun readers who have kept 
up with theistic philosophy of religion during the period that these 
essays were written. Recent theism is less preoccupied with defending 
classical definitions and are more preoccupied with probability argu-
ments, the evidential argument from evil, religious pluralism vs inclu-
sivism or exclusivism, debates over whether beliefs in atheism can them-
selves be rationally justified, debates over the adequacy of materialist 
accounts of consciousness, whether religious experience can be taken as 
cognitive, whether it is rational to accept religious views as basic, and so 
on. Some of the authors whose contributions have been collected in this 
volume have also written arguments against the improbability of 
revised versions of theism. I would hope that the editors would follow 
up with a collection of articles addressed to these other issues. 
Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry, by Jerome Gellman. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. Pp. ix and 148. Price $84.95 (hardback); $24.95 
(paperback). 
KAI-MAN KW AN, Hong Kong Baptist University 
The Argument from Religious/Mystical Experience for the existence of 
God (hereafter ARE) has been reformulated rigorously by analytic 
philosophers like Richard Swinburne, Keith Yandell and William Alston 
in the past few decades. Since then it has attracted a lot of critical discus-
sions among professional philosophers. Jerome Gellman, a professor in 
the Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel, has emerged as one of 
the ablest contemporary defenders of this argument. In his first book on 
religious experience, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief, 
Gellman defends the strong rationality of trusting the validity of experi-
ences of God, and responds to many objections. Gellman now thinks 
that the strong ARE, which concludes that we should be taking mystical 
experiences of God as evidence for their validity until shown otherwise, 
is vulnerable to criticism because it depends on a controversial thesis, 
strong-foundationalism. So Gellman reformulates the ARE in weak-
foundationalist terms. 
This book has six chapters. After introducing the issue in chapter one, 
Gellman spells out the outline of his revised ARE in chapter two. Strong 
foundationalism maintains that a sensory belief is sufficiently justified by 
the relevant sensory experience independent of any confirming beliefs 
or evidence. For Gellman, this position seems to be too strong. In con-
trast, weak foundationalism, while still maintaining that a belief is justi-
fied somewhat by the relevant sensory experience, the latter's evidential 
support on its own is not sufficient. It requires support by other experi-
ences. For example, my present impression that I see a tree gives me ini-
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tial evidential sufficiency together with the rich background of percep-
tions of trees, and of other objects, by myself and by others. My present 
belief gains support by the accumulation of past experiences (p. 23). 
With weak foundationalism, a plausible ARE must come up with 
crosschecks confirming a present perception of God or with reason to 
think crosschecks, if performed, would be successful. This would pro-
vide reason to think that perceptions of God were evidentially accept-
able at least until proven otherwise. So the case for mystical experience 
of God must be built on the entire history of perceptions of God rather 
than mystical experiences considered as isolated episodes. However, 
Gellman rightly points out that we should not tie our notion of confirm-
ing evidence or crosscheck to that associated with sensory perception, 
and to make physical-object claims our evidential standard. It is because 
"Our ordinary physical-object beliefs are way overjustified by confirm-
ing evidence. We have extremely luxurious constellations of confirming 
networks there. Hence it does not follow that were mystical claims justi-
fied to a lesser degree than that, or not by similar procedure, that they 
would be unjustified" (p. 27). Gellman has made an excellent point here, 
which is relevant to most objections to the ARE. Many critics point out 
the ways in which religious experiences differ from sensory experiences, 
and then argue, sometimes convincingly, that religious experiences are 
justified to a lesser extent than sensory experiences. However, they then 
hastily conclude that religious experiences are therefore unjustified. This 
is a non sequitur; it is like arguing that since a scientist is less brilliant 
than Einstein, he must be an incompetent scientist. 
Gellman believes that we need to "judge the extent of confirming evi-
dence for individual perceptions of God on its own terms, by what is 
appropriate to it" (p. 27). This is provided mainly by the numbers, diver-
sity and vividness of mystical experience. Each mystical perception car-
ries some positive evidential value, but on its own it is not sufficient. 
However, the accumulative weight of numerous such experiences over 
time and across cultures, together with the prevalence of "ordinary" 
people haVing experiences of a "higher power," should not be ignored. 
Moreover, various kinds of checking procedures can be applied to mys-
tical experience. For example, the following factors count towards the 
veridicality of a mystical experience: its vividness, profundity and 
sweetness, achievement of self-nullification, positive influence of the 
subject on society, etc. On the other hand, we should dismiss mystical 
experiences which are pathological, staged, unduly influenced by social 
pressures, or conducive to an evil, egocentric life, etc. (pp. 28-32). 
Of course, the prima facie evidential force of mystical experience might 
be overridden by defeaters. In the remaining four chapters, Gellman 
proceeds to rebut many commonly offered defeaters of the ARE. (The 
following is only a very sketchy summary.) In chapter three, Gellman 
responds to Richard Gale who argues that for an object to be qualified as 
a perceptual particular, we must be able to understand what it means for 
the object to exist when not perceived. Physical objects satisfy this condi-
tion because they have spatial-temporal locations. In contrast, God does 
not have dimensionality. So God could not possibly be a perceptual par-
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ticular (p. 41). Moreover, the non-dimensionality of God makes the re-
identification of God impossible because re-identification is possible 
only if the alleged perceptual particular exists in something at least anal-
ogous to space and time. For example, being in different spaces at the 
same time implies numerical distinctness even if there is perceptual 
identity. In reply, Gellman points out that while dimensionality would 
be sufficient to give meaning to the very notion of an object's existing 
unperceived, it is hardly necessary. The idea of God as having a continu-
ous inner life suffices to give content to the concept of God's existence 
unperceived (p. 41). Furthermore, Gale's insistence that the reidentifica-
tion of God needs to conform to our practice of reidentifying physical 
objects is unjustified. Gellman argues that reidentifying physical objects 
is a 'holistic' practice: "we make the determination of the space an object 
occupies relative to reidentification of surrounding objects, while at the 
same time reidentification of surrounding objects depends on a judg-
ment as to what space is occupied" (p. 43). For example, I decide that the 
streetlight in front of my house is the same one that was there yesterday 
because it occupies the same place. However, I decide it is the same 
place because I think it is in front of my same house, on the same stretch 
of the same street, and so on. This in turn depends upon determining 
they occupy the same place they occupied yesterday, and so on (p. 44). 
Since our practice of reidentifying physical objects is in the end circu-
lar, we should not exclude the possibility of there being a holistic prac-
tice specific to the reidentification of God, with its own criteria like the 
seeming constancy of God's character, and God's 'auto-identification." 
"We are not obligated to link the very notion of having evidence for a 
perceptual particular to the specific holistic practice of reidentifying 
physical objects" (p. 44). To buttress this point, Gellman appeals to 
Strawson's purely auditory world, in which the distinction between 
numerical and qualitative identity in a world is based on the pitch of a 
master-sound. 
In chapter four, after examining the nature of reductionist explana-
tions of mystical experience, and criticizing the disappearance theory of 
God-perceptions, Gellman focuses on Matthew Bagger's criticisms. 
Bagger complains that the ARE presupposes an unacceptable kind of 
explanation, i.e., supernatural explanation. Bagger believes that epis-
temic values are culturally relative, and there are no timeless canons of 
explanatory goodness. Since we now live in a modern age, we have to 
judge the acceptability of supernatural explanation with reference to 
modern epistemic values. Since Bagger believes that the "quintessential-
ly modern inquirer" can only accept naturalistic explanations, the ARE 
which presupposes supernatural explanations must be rejected. In reply, 
Gellman points out that for tens of millions of religious devotees in 
modern societies, supernatural explanation is alive and well, and Bagger 
has also ignored the movement of 'new spirituality' in Western coun-
tries. So the secularists who exclude supernatural explanation are only 
one subculture which exists alongside many others in modern societies. 
Furthermore, on Bagger's conventionalist position, it is difficult to justify 
an a priori rejection of supernatural explanation. "To reject alternatives 
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solely because they are not the dominant mode of explanation would be 
to wield conventionalism unjustly as a protective strategy of a most con-
servative kind" (p. 71). (Gellman also suggests that a defender of the 
Argument from Perception might offer a non-interventionist conception 
of genuine God-perceptions. However, I doubt that this move will fully 
pacify a thorough-going naturalist like Bagger.) 
In chapter five, Gellman considers whether sociological and neu-
ropsychological explanations of mystical experience can serve as 
defeaters of the ARE. For example, Evan Fales builds on the studies by 
the anthropologist I. M. Lewis on spirit possession, and suggests that 
mysticism serves as a means of access to political and social power. Fales 
thinks that this sociological understanding of mystical experience is 
superior to the theistic explanation. Gellman responds by producing 
counterexamples to Fales' theory. In the cases of mystics like Jacob 
Boehme (1575-1624), Abraham the son of Maimonides (1186-1237), Baal 
Shem Tov (1698-1760), and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), their 
mystical experiences have little to do with their attainment of power. 
Moreover, there is the phenomenon of non-institutionalized mysticism: 
mystical possession is often independent of social institutions, or the 
mystic is not well-placed for access to power. Gellman further argues 
that even if Fales' theory were convincing, it would not be successful as 
a defeater. Suppose the mystics did manage to achieve improvements 
for their marginalized group by force of their mystical authority. 
Gellman asks, "Isn't it fitting for God to appear to people for the relief of 
oppression and injustice?" 
Gellman also considers Eugene d' Aquili and Andrew Newberg's neu-
rophysiological theory of mysticism. They explain mystical states as the 
effect of 'deafferentiation' - the cutting off of neural input into various 
structures of the nervous system. For example, to explain passive medi-
tation, they propose that the intent to clear the mind of content sets off 
an intricate system of deafferentiation within the brain that results in 
ecstatic and blissful feelings via intense stimulation of structures both in 
the lateral hypothalamus and in the median forebrain area. A conse-
quent neutralizing of the posterior superior parietal lobule, responsible 
for spatial coordination of incoming stimuli, creates a sense of 'pure 
space' experienced as absolute unity or wholeness. Together, the pat-
terns set up in the brain create an overwhelming experience of 'absolute 
unitary being' (p. 95). In similar fashions, the theory proposes explana-
tions of a continuum of mystical experiences, both theistic and non-the-
istic. While Gellman notes that d' Aquili and Newberg themselves cau-
tion against a reductionist reading of their theory, he points out that the 
d' Aquili-Newberg theory does carry reductionist pressure concerning 
experiences specifically of God. 
To rebut the attempt to take this kind of neurophysiological theory of 
religious experience as a defeater of the ARE, Gellman raises several 
points. First, the theory fails to take seriously enough the perceptual 
character of mystical experiences of God. "Instead, it treats such experi-
ences as composed entirely of a cluster of subjective feelings waiting to 
be interpreted by the subject as a perceptual episode" (p. 98). However, 
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mystical experience of God is not merely a matter of feelings. So "its 
neuropsychological tale cannot be the whole story. At best, it accounts 
for the physiological basis for the affective concomitants of mystical 
experiences" (p. 98). Second, the neuropsychological theory is not 
incompatible with the idea that God is the external ultimate cause of 
those mystical experiences. In fact we should have expected that a non-
sensory perception of God would involve unique brain events. So the 
neurophysiological theory by itself does not defeat a theistic explanation 
(p. 99). Here Gellman has interesting observations about what types of 
neuropsychological theory would overcome the evidential weight of the 
mystical experiences. During the process he raises deep questions that 
deserve further exploration. 
In chapter six, Gellman addresses feminists who query the entire ana-
lytic approach to mysticism. They argue that by focusing upon private, 
individual experiences in mysticism, the philosopher ignores social and 
structural ills, e.g. oppression of women (pp. 103ff). They regard con-
cepts like "experience," "evidence," and "rationality" as androcentric 
constructions which are used to mask the interests of upper middle-class 
white Western males (p. 109). In response, Gellman questions whether 
there is empirical evidence for the contention that treating mysticism as 
"private" reflects a desire to repress women by consigning them to a pri-
vate sphere. Although the proponents of the ARE focuses on the episte-
mology of mystical experiences, it does not imply a denial of justice to 
women (p. 106). Gellman agrees that "philosophers should be open to 
the richness of content and texture of women's experiences and interpre-
tations" (p. 110), but he thinks this can be construed realistically rather 
than relativistically. In the end, even feminists cannot get away from the 
fact that our experiences do have evidential relevance. We know, for 
example, from experience that white male bias infects the concept of 
"objectivity." 
In the end Gellman only draws a modest conclusion. He admits that 
the ARE is not universally rationally compelling, in the sense of rational-
ly obligating all who would ponder it to accept it. Despite Gellman's 
rebuttal of the alleged defeaters (e.g., the inadmissibility of supernatural 
explanation, gender objections), it seems to me Gellman still grants that 
the critics can rationally hold on to those "defeaters." However, Gellman 
emphasizes that those" defeaters" have not been shown to be rationally 
compelling for everyone either. So the ARE "is a line of reasoning that 
can be held (only) by some in a rational way that confers evidential suf-
ficiency on the phenomenon of perceptions of God" (p. 52). 
I think Gellman's attempt to defend a modest form of ARE is largely 
successful, and his replies to various objections are in general cogent. 
The significance of Gellman's work should be understood in light of his 
contribution to a new research project in philosophy of religion and 
epistemology. Swinburne, Alston and Gellman are not only reviving 
natural theology; they are also proposing a new epistemological 
approach which navigates between strong foundationalism and post-
modern relativism. They admit our epistemic base is fallible but they 
advocate an attitude of prima facie trust to replace Cartesian doubt. While 
558 Faith and Philosophy 
"trust without infallible proof" used to be treated as irrational, now they 
suggest the spirit of rationality should be construed as "trust until 
shown otherwise by criticisms." They maintain the emphasis on experi-
ence but try to break loose of the straigh~acket of traditional empiricism 
by broadening the evidential base of experience. The basic rationale is 
that in the end we need to adopt an initial attitude of basic or fundamental 
trust (i.e., a trust that can't be non-circularly justified) towards our per-
ceptual experiences. In that case, it would be unfair to grant this kind of 
basic trust to sense experiences alone while adopting initial skepticism 
towards other kinds of perceptual experiences. This is nothing other 
than the construction of a radically new epistemology, which takes the 
Principle of Critical Trust (hereafter PCT) as a fundamental principle of 
justification / rationali ty (I prefer this name to "the Princi pIe of 
Credulity"). Together with the efforts of Swinburne, Alston, Yandell, 
Caroline Davis, etc., Gellman, by effectively rebutting the common 
objections to this new approach in his two books, has helped to show 
that this new epistemology of religious experience is at least more 
viable, and more resistant to refutation than many critics think. 
In fact, given Gellman's rebuttal of the objections, I wonder whether 
some of his concessions are necessary. For example, Gellman grants that 
those for whom supernatural explanation is not an explanatory option 
can rationally reject the ARE. For me, this rejection is only rational in the 
very weak sense of "not capable of being conclusively disproved." This 
move seems to lack positive epistemic justification, and the underlying 
motivation is basically a dogmatic presupposition of naturalism. Similar 
things can be said about those who think God's non-dimensionality 
automatically disqualifies him from being a perceptual particular. This 
seems to betray a kind of epistemic chauvinism by taking sense experi-
ence to be the only standard. I am also puzzled by Gellman's final con-
cession to the feminist objections. I think his reply has sufficiently shown 
that while God-perceptions may have been misused in their traditional 
context, it does not follow that their evidential force is then completely 
annulled. While I also think that the naturalistic explanation objection 
cannot successfully defeat the ARE (at least at this moment), I do think it 
ought to be taken more seriously. In fact Gellman's discussions do show 
a kind of ambivalence about this issue. This is also likely to be the major 
battleground where the proponents and the critics of the ARE will meet. 
Gellman wants to mount the ARE on the basis of weak foundational-
ism rather than strong foundationalism. To clarify the issue, let me note 
that the Principle of Critical Trust (PCT) can be formulated in several 
ways: 
(generic PCT) Every perceptual experience of X provides some 
justification of belief in the existence of X. 
(strong PCT) Every perceptual experience of X provides prima 
facie justification of belief in the existence of X that 
is sufficient in the absence of defeaters. 
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(weak PCT) Every perceptual experience of X provides some 
but less than sufficient justification of belief in the 
existence of X. 
The strong PCT is incompatible with the weak PCT but both entail the 
generic PCT. Because Gellman seems to be swayed by the criticisms of 
Levinson and Malino, and Fales, he wants to withdraw his previous 
support of the strong PCT. Instead, he thinks that the ARE on the basis 
of the weak PCT is easier to defend. I agree that the weak PCT may look 
more reasonable and less controversial to more people. So if ARE can be 
defended in this form, it increases the argument's appeal and persuasive 
power. In this sense Gellman's attempt to work out a revised ARE is 
commendable. In fact Gellman is not the first one to suggest this revision 
of ARE. Gary Gutting and David Brown have similar proposals, and 
William Lycan holds to a form of weak PCT (though he does not apply it 
to religious experience). However, I am not entirely certain that the 
strong PCT is completely indefensible. 
Basically, Levinson and Malino argue that a perception of any kind 
enjoys initial evidential sufficiency only when there are intersubjective 
tests for the veridicality of the perception, which have been performed 
and turned out positive, or which there is reason to believe would turn 
out positive if they were performed. Fales argues that crosscheckability 
must be integral parts of any perceptual epistemic practice before we can 
take it on trust. So the strong PCT is mistaken. Well, this issue is not new 
and long time ago C. B. Martin forcefully voiced this objection: "the 
presence of a piece of blue paper is not to be read off from my experi-
ence as a piece of blue paper. Other things are relevant: What would a 
photograph reveal? Can I touch it? What do others see?" However, the 
equally trenchant reply by Mavrodes has brought out the problems with 
this kind of objection: 
"Suppose that I do try to photograph the paper. What then? 
Martin asks, "What would a photograph reveal?" To discover 
what the photograph reveals I would ordinarily look at it. But if 
the presence of blue paper is not to be "read off" from my experi-
ence then the presence of a photograph, and a fortiori what the pho-
tograph reveals, is not to be read off from my experience either. It 
begins to look as though I must take a photograph of the photo-
graph, and so on ... The same sort of thing happens if I try to deter-
mine "what others see." I send for my friend to look at the paper ... 
But his presence is not to be read off from my experience either. 
Perhaps I must have a third man to tell me whether the second has 
come and the infinite regress appears again. Interpreted in this 
way, Martin's thesis fails because it converts into a general require-
ment something that makes sense only as an occasional procedure. 
At most we can substitute one unchecked experience for another." 
Inter-subjective tests and crosschecks are good things to have but the 
problem is that all these checks are ultimately circular in the sense that 
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their reliability has to be presupposed if they are to do any useful work. 
If the strong peT cannot be applied to an isolated perception and hence 
the latter has to be kept in suspense, how can the other perceptions help 
if their epistemic status is equally insecure? Should we not also keep 
them in suspense? Furthermore, to bring the past record of testing to 
bear on an isolated experience, we have to trust our memory. The skepti-
cal question will rise again here: why can we trust this memory before 
extensive testing? This memory should then be crosschecked with other 
memories or perceptions but then what about those? The circle goes on 
and on and I am not sure the ensuing project of epistemic justification 
will be promising. 
Of course the above discussions have only scratched the surface of the 
epistemic Pandora's box. If the strong peT is defensible, this will only 
strengthen the ARE. Anyway, the strong peT is controversial and 
Gellman's constructive employment of the weaker peT is welcome. 
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